This paper explores the aggregate consequences of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on the opportunities for risk diversification available to consumers. The crucial difference between FDI and other international financial flows is that the former involves technology flows across countries. We present a model where firm-embedded productivity can be transferred costly across countries through the activity of multinational firms. We find that risk patterns affect multinationals' location decisions and, in turn, these decisions change the scope for international risk diversification even in a world with complete financial markets.
Introduction
The exchange of financial assets across borders enables consumers to better diversify country specific risk. The literature on international risk sharing has extensively analyzed the properties of these financial assets such as bonds, equity of foreign firms, including multinational firms with productive activities in foreign markets. This literature does not typically distinguishes Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from other financial flows in regard of its consequences for international risk sharing opportunities. However, FDI is different from other financial flows in that it also represents a channel through which countries exchange goods, capital, ideas, and technologies. 1 An important fraction of firm productivity seems to be transferable only within the boundaries of the firm. 2 Thus, FDI flows entail transfers of firm-specific technology across countries that is otherwise immobile. This paper explores the aggregate consequences of FDI flows on the opportunities for risk diversification available to consumers. We emphasize the role played by FDI in transferring technologies across countries and reshaping international goods' and factors' markets. The activity of multinational firms has then consequences for the pattern of consumption risk. We uncover a number of novel implications stemming from treating FDI simultaneously as a financial and technology flow in a risky environment.
First, when Multinational Production (MP) activities are both treated as a financial and technology flow, their role in international risk sharing goes beyond the mere substitution for a portfolio of international financial assets. The international technology transfers entailed by MP have implications for the pattern of world risk as it alters the relative impact of country shocks on world markets. In other words, while international financial assets enable agents to redistribute output across countries in different states of the world, MP alters the amount of 1 The characterization of multinational firms as developers of technologies has been central to models explaining multinational firms activity (see Caves (1996) and Markusen (2002) for an overview of this literature).
2 See Helpman (1984), Antras (2003) , Antras and Helpman (2004) .
output available in each of these states.
Second, the overall effect of MP on consumption risk crucially depends on the direction of FDI flows. The consumption risk premium is reduced if firms locate their production in countries with shocks least correlated with world aggregate risk. By increasing productivity in countries where affiliates are located, MP changes the impact of host country shocks on world markets, and increases production in those states of nature that world output is relatively scarce.
We present a multi-country model where the only source of uncertainty is the existence of country shocks, and where risk-averse consumers have access to a full set of contingent claims.
With a freely-tradable final consumption good, consumers attain perfect risk sharing: consumption in each country fluctuates with world output that experiences states of (relative) scarcity and abundance.
To emphasize that FDI entails transfers of productivity that is otherwise immobile, we introduce a "firm-imbedded" productivity parameter which can be broadly understood as technology, managerial know-how, or organizational capital. 3 Firms are heterogenous in their productivity and compete monopolistically. They can serve foreign markets by opening affiliates there after paying a fixed entry cost. The same firm productivity parameter characterizes the parent company and its affiliates. 4 In a risky environment, the natural question is which type of shocks affect MP activities.
We model affiliates to exclusively supply the host market, so their demand is driven by the host country fluctuations. 5 This is aimed at describing the vast majority of multinational sales:
according to UNCTAD (2009) only 20% of gross production by foreign affiliates is sold outside the country of production. The source of country fluctuations is a productivity shock that affects the cost of labor in the destination market. One can think of alternative specifications that would add other considerations to our results. For example, that productivity shocks are specific to the multinational firm regardless of where its affiliates are located. Yet, as long as there are shocks that affect all production located in a country, our result holds: the location decisions of firms change the weight given to host country shocks in overall world output.
The world described in this paper is analogous to a Lucas-type endowment economy where the number of trees in a country represents the number of firms located in an island, and the country shocks affect the amount of fruits delivered by each tree located in the economy. Since risk-averse consumers have access to a complete set of contingent securities, consumption only fluctuates with world non-diversifiable risk; that is, the world amount of fruits in each state of nature. Yet, consumption volatility could be further reduced if trees were transferred to economies with shocks least correlated with world output.
By modeling the location decision of firms, technology transfer across countries occurs endogenously. The predicted effect of MP on consumption risk is ambiguous. With complete financial markets, firms internalize consumers' desire for smooth consumption. Then, everything else equal, they find optimal to open affiliates in economies least correlated with world risk, typically small countries. In doing so, they tend to reduce overall consumption risk. However, production has economies of scale, which provides incentives to open affiliates in large markets and negatively affect consumption smoothness.
We calibrate entry costs to the observed pattern of bilateral MP flows, country shocks to the time series properties of real GDP per capita, and country's size to a measure of equipped labor, for a set of OECD countries. Our calibration suggests that large countries tend to be net exporters of technologies, which contributes to reduce consumption risk. However, as country shocks are strongly correlated, technology transfers embedded in MP flows reduce the consumption risk premium by only 0.21% relative to a world with no MP.
Our model is closed to the literature on trade in the context of country specific risk. 6 In particular, Razin (1984, 1985) introduce production risk into a model that jointly determines the international pattern of trade and capital flows. They analyze the choice between risky and risk-free production across asymmetric countries, and find, as we do, that it is efficient to locate risky production in the small economy. We build on that result by endogenizing the location decision of firms.
We also add to the literature on foreign direct investment and risk diversification. 7 This literature typically considers models with imperfect access to financial markets, and multinational production enables agents to hedge country risk. Our paper, on the contrary, considers integrated and sophisticated financial markets that allow firms and consumers to perfectly share country specific risk. We think this is a relevant benchmark, especially for developed economies, which concentrate most of multinational activities. Indeed, using a large cross-country timeseries data set, Alburqueque et al (2005) find that FDI flows are increasingly explained by world factors, consistent with integrated and well functioning world financial markets.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 presents the set-up of the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 4 describes the main mechanism of the model, and present the calibration exercise. Section 5 concludes. (2004) , FDI enables firms to adjust location of production according to the realization of the shock; this mechanism is not exploited in our paper.
Model
We present a multi-country stochastic model with a complete set of state-contingent claims.
There is an homogenous final consumption good that is freely tradable, and a continuum of intermediate goods. The sources of uncertainty are country-specific shocks that affect productivity in the final good sector.
Firms in the intermediate goods' sector are heterogenous in productivity, and compete monopolistically, along the lines of Melitz (2003) . The only way they can serve foreign consumers is by opening affiliates in that market; no trade is allowed in this sector. Crucially, affiliates inherit their parent specific productivity at a cost.
Our analysis distinguishes between two assets: shares of firms, some of which are multinationals, and a portfolio of other risky and risk-free assets -a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities.
Set-up
There are I countries, each of size L i , endowed with Y i (0) units of final good. There are two periods: an initial period before uncertainty is realized in which trade in Arrow-Debreu securities and FDI (that is, the set up of foreign production facilities) take place; and a second period after uncertainty is realized in which production takes place. This set-up is aimed at capturing that FDI decisions present irreversibilities that make reallocation costly after the productivity shock is realized. Agents consume in both periods. Let the vector s ∈ S denote the state of the world economy in the second period characterized by the realization of country shocks, A = [A 1 , ..., A I ] ∈ R I + . We assume that there is a finite number of states, S = {s 1 , ..., s N }, each occurring with probability Pr(s) > 0, N s=1 Pr(s) = 1.
Productivity shocks to the final good sector are the only source of uncertainty in this world.
We make that explicit using the notation A i (s). Without loss of generality, we assume that
The representative consumer in country i supplies L i units of labor and maximizes expected utility from final consumption, with time separable preferences, and constant relative risk aversion, σ:
Production. The final consumption good is produced under perfect competition with a constant returns to scale technology that combines labor and the composite intermediate good,
where 0 < α < 1, and A i (s) denotes country i s productivity shock. Provided that it is produced everywhere, the price of the final good is equalized across countries and normalized to one.
The index Q i (s) aggregates a continuum of intermediates goods with a constant elasticity of substitution η > 1. Each intermediate good ω is produced with an only-labor constant returns technology, and firm-specific productivity z(ω). This parameter is known, and drawn from a country-specific distribution, G i (z), z ∈ [z min , ∞), independently distributed across countries.
Crucially, firms can open affiliates abroad with the same productivity parameter z(ω) as the one they have at home. The production function for a firm from country i producing good ω in country j is
where q ij (ω, s) and l ij (ω, s) are output and labor requirements, respectively. When i = j, 8 In this economy, all asymmetries in E (Ai) are equivalently to differences in labor endowments Li.
q ii (ω, s) denotes output produced by national firms. Since the only parameter that varies across differentiated goods is the firm-specific productivity z(ω) and goods enter symmetrically in preferences, we can rename each good ω by its productivity z.
Firms compete monopolistically, the price charged by a firm with productivity z from country i producing in j is given by a mark-up over marginal cost,
where W j (s) denotes the wage in country j, state s. Total expenditure in an intermediate good supplied by an affiliate from country i in j is given by
where P j (s) is the price index associated to the CES composite intermediate input, Q j (s).
Assets Structure. The representative consumer in each country holds two types of assets:
shares of firms, θ i (z), and fully contingent bonds, B i (s). Without loss of generality, we assume that consumers in country i own firms from country i only, θ i (z) = 1 and θ j (z) = 0 for j = i. 9 With complete financial markets, the budget constraint for the representative consumer in country i is given by
where ϕ (s) is the date-zero price of an Arrow-Debreu security that pays one unit of final consumption in state s, and B i (0) is consumers' initial wealth, net of the cost of setting up affiliates.
The variable π i (z, s) denotes total profits for a firm from country i, with technology z, in state 9 Results are unchanged if national firms are initially owned by national consumers and sold in the international market.
s given by
where π ij (z, s) denote profits made in market j, given by x ij (z, s)/η, and ι ij (z) is one if the firm produces in country j, and zero otherwise.
The consumer's optimization problem entails the following Euler equation:
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 10 A firm from country i that decides to enter market j pays a one time entry cost f ij . Each country i is endowed with a stock of final goods, Y i (0), and the entry costs are paid at time zero, before the realization of the shock, in units of this good.
The value of doing MP in country j for a firm from country i with productivity z is given by the expected discounted flow of profits in that market,
where ϕ (s) correspond to the price of an Arrow-Debreu security that pays a unit of the consumption good in state s and satisfies the Euler equation (5) .
Only firms for which the value of doing MP in market j is larger than the entry cost will open affiliates in that market. Hence, the entry decision is characterized by a cut-off rule defined by the following zero profit condition:
Firms from country i with z ≥ z ij open affiliates in j, ι ij (z) = 1; the ones with z < z ij do not, ι ij (z) = 0. 11 Without loss of generality, we assume that national firms have zero entry costs,
Finally, net wealth for the representative consumer in country i in equation (4) is given by:
that is, the value of the endowment net of the entry cost of setting up foreign affiliates.
Equilibrium
We define the equilibrium in two steps. First, we characterize equilibrium prices and quantities for each country i and state of nature s as functions of the number of firms in each country. In the second step, we characterize the equilibrium entry decisions of firms across country-pairs.
National Equilibrium
Definition 1. Given the matrix {z ji } I j=1 , an equilibrium in country i and state s is defined by the vectors of output, labor demands, and prices for intermediate goods, 11 From (2), pij (z, s) is inversely related to the firms's productivity z. Thus, with η > 1, profits increase with z, P s∈S ϕ(s)
∂ ∂z πij(z, s) > 0 where πij(z, s) = xij(z, s)/η. Hence, the optimal entry decision into market j for firms from country i is characterized by a productivity level zij such that Vij (zij) − fij = 0. For all firms with productivity z above that cut-off, the condition Vij (z) > fij is satisfied and entering market j is optimal.
2. For each good z, market clears,
3. Labor market clears,
where
4. The law of one price for the final good holds. 
where φ 1 and φ 2 are positive constants. 12 As expected, wages depend positively on aggregate productivity, both in the intermediate good sector Z i and final good sector A i (s). Moreover, the
effect of country shocks A i (s) on wages translate one-to-one into the price of the intermediate
, which is larger in states with higher realizations of A i (s). Labor market equilibrium in (9) implies that total output in the final good sector in country i, state s, is: 13
where φ 3 is a positive constant. 14 Y i (s) is proportional to the country-wide productivity shock A i (s) with the proportionality factor increasing with the size of the economy L i and the overall productivity of firms located in i, Z i .
Finally, using equations (2), (3), and (11), profits for a firm with productivity z from country j operating in country i are
Profits co-move one-to-one with the productivity shock in the host market A i (s) through its effect on host country final output Y i (s). Market shares,
, are constant across states of nature, but larger for firms with higher z, and in markets with lower Z i (i.e. less competition).
International Equilibrium
Definition 2. For a given vector of initial endowments,
, the international equilibrium is defined by the matrix {z ij } i,j , the vector of prices for Arrow-Debreu securities {ϕ(s)} s∈S , the vector of consumption and holdings of Arrow-Debreu securities
respectively, for each s ∈ S, such that.
13 Using the market clearing condition for good z in (8), the aggregate labor demand in the intermediate goods sector for firms from country j producing in i is Lji(s)
. Combined with (9), we obtain
Wi (s) Li, which leads to expression (12). 14 φ3 ≡ φ1 η η−1+α . (5) is satisfied, for all countries i = 1, ..., I;
The Euler equation in
2. The budget constraint in (4) is satisfied, for all countries i = 1, ..., I;
3. The productivity cutoffs {z ij } i,j satisfy the zero profit conditions in (7), for all country pairs i, j = 1, ...I;
4. Arrow-Debreu securities are in zero net supply, for each s ∈ S,
5. The world resource constraint for the final good is satisfied, for each s ∈ S,
The world described in this paper is analogous to a Lucas-type endowment economy with risky output in every country i given by equation (12) ,
as the number of "trees", and A i (s) as the amount of "fruits" delivered in state s by each tree located in i.
Define the average world shock A W (s) as the weighted average of country-specific shocks,
World output can then be expressed as
. World output increases with a positive productivity shock to any country, dY W /dA i > 0, and the impact of country i's shock on Y W (s) increases with the country's share of world
In other words, the number of efficiency units of labor located in each country determines the impact of country-specific shocks on world output.
With frictionless trade in the final good and complete financial markets, perfect international risk sharing is attained. The ratio of consumptions between any country pair is constant across states of nature,
, and consumption in any country i is a constant share of the world output of the final good,
where In this respect, FDI flows are fundamentally different from other international financial flows:
they entail technology transfers that alter productivity in the receiving country. 15 By affecting aggregate firm-specific productivity Z i , and hence i , MP changes the allocation of "trees" across countries, and the impact of country-specific shocks on world aggregate fluctuations. 15 In the Appendix, we present a version of the model with physical capital that is freely movable across countries. In this extension, the results from the basic model are amplified.
Moreover, as shown in Lemma 1, consumption risk is reduced when affiliates locate in economies with shocks least correlated with aggregate risk.
W ; A i , and let ρ be the consumption risk premium defined by
Consider two countries j and h such that Ψ j > Ψ h : when technology flows such that
A crucial assumption for this result is that affiliates bear the shock specific to the host country. We assume that country shocks only affect affiliates through their impact on the unit cost of labor. Thus, it is natural to assume these shocks affect all firms located in a country, irrespectively of their origin. A different shock specification could add other considerations to the result in Lemma 1. Yet, as long as there are shocks that affect all production located in a country, this result holds.
In the next section we characterize the equilibrium with endogenous the location of firm and derive its implications for consumption risk premium i in country j, net of entry costs is
, as specified in equation (12) . It is easy to see the factors that
give incentives to firms to do MP into a market. The size of the labor force L j , by increasing total output Y j (s), increases profits in all states s, in country j, and hence increases the value of doing MP. Aggregate productivity of firms located in country j, Z j , affects the value of doing MP in two offsetting ways. On the one hand, more productive competing firms reduce market shares of an affiliate, which negatively affects profits in all s. On the other hand, higher aggregate productivity of firms in the host market increases final output and hence expenditure in country j.
Under Assumption 1, the competition effect dominates, and the value of doing MP in (18) decreases with aggregate productivity of firms Z i . 16 Finally, as pointed out in previous literature, higher entry costs, f ij , also reduce the net value of doing MP into market j.
MP and Country Risk
In a risky environment, the stochastic properties of country shocks are a factor determining the value of doing MP for a firm with productivity z from country i in j.
Replacing (17) in (5), the price of an Arrow-Debreu security in state s is
where φ 4 is a positive constant, and Y W (s) world output in equation (16) . 17 The value of doing MP in country j can be expressed as
where φ 5 is a positive constant. 18 Crucially, the discounted flow of profits depends on the correlation between the marginal utility of consumption, which co-moves with Y W (s) −σ , and output in the host country,
Intuitively, a flow of profits is more valuable if its realizations are larger in states when
Arrow-Debreu prices are high, or equivalently, the marginal utility of consumption is high, which signals that world output is relatively scarce.
Further replacing Y j (s) and Y W (s) with (12) and (16), respectively, the value of an affiliate with productivity z located in country j can be expressed in terms of the correlation between the shock in the host country, A j , and the world average productivity shock, A W ,
where φ 6 is a positive constant. 19 The stochastic properties of A j (s) determine the value of a foreign affiliate located in j. Everything else equal, it is more profitable to locate affiliates in economies with shocks less correlated with world risk A W (s). This is the intuition behind the following proposition.
for all i, and f ij = f , for all i = j. Then, the location of affiliates is such that, for any country pair i, h:
In a symmetric world, where countries only differ in the stochastic process of their shocks, the
number of foreign affiliates and, therefore, production, is largest in those economies with shocks least correlated with world risk. This is because with frictionless financial markets, the price of financial assets reflects consumers risk aversion, and firms use such prices to discount profits.
Hence, the equilibrium location of production across countries is efficient. 20 
MP and Country Size
Results in the previous subsection abstracted from size differences across countries and just focused on differences in the stochastic process of country shocks. Now, we focus on asymmetries coming from country's size, L i , but assume that shocks are i.i.d across countries.
Notice that the size of L i determines the effect of country i's shock on world output, as indicated by equation (14),
. A shock to a large economy has a stronger impact on world production. Consequently, world output tends to co-move with large economies rather than smaller ones. The following lemma formalizes this intuition.
Proof: See Appendix. 2 20 The social planner problem is shown in the Appendix With i.i.d. shocks, large economies are the ones that strongly co-move with world shocks.
As emphasized in Proposition 1, this characteristic negatively affects MP inflows into larger economies. However, production is subject to economies of scale so larger markets attracts more MP flows. Then, as it can be seen from equation (20) Proposition 2. Let ρ be the consumption risk premium defined by
Assume that
, then technology flows of
, then technology flows of the form dZ jh > 0 decrease the consumption risk premium.
Proof: See Appendix. 2
The effects of MP Liberalization on Consumption Risk
The interaction among country size, entry cost, and the stochastic properties of country shocks determine the location pattern of affiliates. In turn, these patterns dictate how MP flows affect the consumption risk premium. In this numerical exercise, we calibrate the MP entry costs to observed bilateral MP, country size to a measure of equipped labor, and country shocks to the observed time series properties of real GDP per capita, for a set of OECD countries. 21 We use the calibrated version of the model to perform counterfactual exercises that highlight the effects of the location patterns of affiliates of multinational firms on the consumption risk premium.
Parameters are chosen in the following way. Bilateral fixed costs are calibrated to exactly match the gross value of production of affiliates from country i in j, as share of country j's GDP, for an average over the nineties, from UNCTAD. 22 The variable L i is set to a measure of total labor force in which employment is adjusted to account for human and physical capital per worker, for an average over the nineties, from Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005). We assume that the vector of country shocks follows a log-normal distribution of the form log A ∼ N (µ, Ω),
where µ is the vector of average (log) realizations of the shock, and Ω is the variance-covariance matrix, across countries. We calibrate the matrix Ω to the variance-covariance matrix of the (log of) real GDP per capita (at constant prices, PPP-adjusted) observed in the data, for the period 1970-2004, from Penn World Tables (6. 2). 23 The vector µ is chosen so that the resulting output per capita across countries (relative to the U.S.) replicates the average GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted) observed in the data, for the nineties, also from Penn World Tables (6. 2). 24 We assume that firm specific productivity is drawn from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter γ (common across countries), G(z) = 1 − z −γ , that we scale by the size of the country's labor
All data used in this calibration are presented in the appendix.
The remaining parameters are taken from the literature, as shown in the following Table 1 .
The calibration procedure and data are described in more detail in the Appendix, as well as a sensitivity analysis around parameters. 23 We de-trend the log of real GDP per capita (RGDPL) series using a Hodrick-Precott filter. 24 We calibrate the variables related to the size of countries, L and µ using an average over the nineties. Thus, consistently, these two variables are constructed for the same period as for which the MP data are available. Finally, the model provides a measure of the technology transfer embedded in MP flows between country pairs. This is the index for firm specific productivity for affiliates from country Table 2 present outward, inward, and net technology flows, respectively, by country (each as a share of total flows in the world). Outward flows from country i are computed as j;j =i Z ij , while inward flows are j;j =i Z ji , both as a share of i,j;i =j Z ij . Although this measure of technology transfer is directly derived from the matrix of bilateral MP sales, it does not correspond to the same concept. According to our model, total sales by affiliates are given not only by their technology, but also by the unit cost of labor, the degree of competition in the host market, imbedded in the price index, and the scale of the host market. As a result, the matrix of technology flows and MP sales do not necessarily : size is measured by i , which is the model measure of the share of country i in world effective productive size, as defined in equation (15) , in percentage. : COR A −σ W ; A i is the correlation coefficient between the shock in country i and the state-dependent part of the stochastic discount factor, given by the model measure of the world average shock A W as defined in equation (14) .
Parameter Value Source
† : Median Outward MP costs for country i = median j =i f ij (relative to median j =U S f U S,j ); Median Inward MP costs for country i = median j =i f ji (relative to median j =U S f j,U S ). ‡ : Outward technology flows for country i = j;j =i Z ij , Inward technology flows for country i= j;j =i Z ji , and Net = Outward -Inward. Technology flows are expressed as % of world total technology flows i,j;i =j Z ij . coincide. Nevertheless, the two type of flows are closely related. 25 The next two tables perform counterfactual exercises in order to evaluate the impact of MP flows on aggregate risk. 25 Only two countries out of nineteen in the sample are net exporters of technology according to our model, but register negative net MP sales in the data. Total outward and inward MP flows in the data for each country are presented in table 10 in the Appendix. According to our calibrated model, total welfare increases by 0.5% relative to a world with no MP. 26 To evaluate the impact of MP on consumption risk, we calculate the change in the consumption risk premium that results of moving from a world without MP (f ij → ∞ for all i = j) but complete financial markets, to a world with the observed patterns of MP. As shown in Table 6 , the observed location of MP activities across countries reduces the consumption risk premium by only 0.21% with respect to a world with complete financial markets but no endogenous reallocation of production.
Overall Effect
Two offsetting forces are behind the overall effect of the endogenous reallocation of production on the consumption risk premium. As shown in Table 2 , large economies are net sources of technology, while small economies tend to be net recipients. If countries had i.i.d. shocks, flows towards smaller countries should reduce consumption risk, as shown in Proposition 2. However, the countries in our sample are far from exhibiting i.i.d. shocks. And most MP sales occur among highly correlated countries, which increases consumption risk. To highlight this point, we decompose the overall impact of MP on the consumption risk premium into two effects.
First, we isolate the "size" effect. We assume that country shocks are i.i.d. with identical mean and variance given by the sample median, and countries are heterogenous in size L i as in our calibrated version of the model. 27 Using this environment, we ask how much the consumption 26 The first order effect of MP activities is always positive as it always increases the productive capacity of the countries. 27 Using the mean rather than the median for the variance and mean of country shocks delivers very similar results.
risk premium would change if we moved from a world without MP but complete financial markets to a world with the observed cross-country patterns of MP. 28 In line with Proposition 2, since small countries are net receivers of foreign technologies, the presence of MP flows reduces the consumption risk premium by 2.01%. Second, to isolate the effect of the actual covariance matrix ("risk" effect), we show the effect of MP flows on the consumption risk premium taking the stochastic process for country shocks from the data, as in our calibrated benchmark, but with the counterfactual assumption that countries are symmetric in size (L i = I k=1 L k /I, for all i). Again, using this second environment, we ask how much the consumption risk premium would change if we moved from a world without MP but complete financial markets to a world with the observed cross-country patterns of MP. Our calculations suggest that the consumption risk premium increases by 1.57% due to this effect, offsetting the size effect. 29 No MP ‡ Benchmark † frictionless MP frictionless MP from U.S. into U.S. Change in risk premium (from world with no MP to:) -0.21% -7.5% 3.9% † : calibrated version of the model. ‡ : counterfactual with f ij → ∞ for all i = j. : f U S,j = 0, for all j, and f ij → ∞ for all i = j and i = U S. : counterfactual with f j,U S = 0 for all j and f ij = ∞ for all i = j and j = U S. → ∞ for all i = j. : f U S,j = 0, for all j, and f ij → ∞ for all i = j and i = U S. : counterfactual with f j,U S = 0 for all j and f ij = ∞ for all i = j and j = U S. for all i = j and i = U S, while column IV presents the case in which f j,U S = 0 for all source countries j and f ij = ∞ for all i = j and j = U S. In According to our calibrated model, the United States, being the largest country in the sample, have also the strongest co-movement with world risk (0.89). As suggested by Proposition 2, when they are the only source of MP flows in the world (column III), the risk premium is reduced by 7.5% with respect to autarky. In this case, the co-movement between U.S.'s GDP and world's fluctuations drops by 5.5% relative to autarky, as U.S. specific shock affects a lower share of world production. Correspondingly, when the United States are the sole recipient of affiliates from the remaining eighteen OECD countries (column IV), the correlation between U.S.'s GDP and world fluctuations rises by almost 4%. In this case, the rest of the world reduces its capacity to provide insurance against U.S. shocks and the consumption risk premium increases by 3.9%.
Conclusions
This paper emphasizes the connection between international technology flows and the pattern of international risk. We analyze the effects of a natural form of technology transfer across countries: the one embedded in the activity of multinational firms.
By modeling Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as an international technology and portfolio
flow, the main contribution of this paper is to uncover an additional channel through which the activities of multinational firms change consumer's welfare. By altering host country's productivity, the activity of multinational firms affects the patterns of world risk even under complete financial markets.
Recall that A W (s) ≡ i i A i (s). Under the assumption that E (A i ) = 1, for all i = 1, ..., I, the risk premium decreases if
Proof of Proposition 1
By contradiction. Consider for a moment there is country j * such that the marginal multinational firm from country j * into country i and h satisfies z j * i ≥ z j * h . Since f jk = f for all j, then V (z j * k ) = V (z jk ) for all j. Follows from equation (7) that z jk = z k for all j. Then, if z j * i ≥ z j * h , it has to be that z ji ≥ z jh for all j and therefore, Z i < Z h . Similarly, since f jk = f for all k, the free entry condition for the marginal firm implies V (z j * i ) = V (z j * h ). Replacing with equation (7), this condition can be rewritten as:
.
From (19) and (12), we know that
Then, under Assumption (1) and Ψ i > Ψ h , it has to be that z j * i ≥ z j * h only if Z i > Z h , which it was proven above not to be the case. Then, it must be that for all j = i, h: z ji < z jh .2
Proof of Lemma 2
, where A i (s) are i.i.d. and positive, for all i = 1, ..., I and s ∈ S. Therefore, A W (s) > 0, for all s ∈ S, which implies the following condition:
Assume for the moment that
Applying the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 1, the inequality cov A 
Proof of Proposition 2
From Lemma 2 follows that
. Let −h be a geographic agglomerate of all countries except h. Since shocks are i.i.d.: Ψ h < Ψ −h . From equation (15) , follows that:
Follows from Lemma 1 that any location of affiliates that results in dZ h > 0, and therefore
, technology flows of the form dZ jh > 0 decrease ρ.2
Social Planner Problem
The social planner is constrained to monopolistic competition in the intermediate good market. That is, the social planner problem takes quantities from the national equilibrium in Section 3.1 as given. The efficient allocation is defined by
that satisfies the following program:
where λ i is weight of country i on the Social Planner's objective function. As in the decentralized economy presented in the paper, the optimal allocation involves perfect international risk sharing,
, as in equation (17) in the body of the paper. The efficient entry decision for a firm from country j into country i is given by a cut-off productivity level z ji that satisfies the following first order condition:
The multiplier µ (s) on the world resource constraint in state s is the marginal utility of world output in that state of nature:
. Thus, with CRRA preferences, the following condition characterizes the efficient location of affiliates:
where A W is defined as in the body of the paper:
. This condition is equivalent to the zero profit condition in (20) for the decentralized problem.
Model's Extension: Physical Capital
The model in Section 2 has labor as the only factor of production, which is assumed immobile across countries. In this section, we extend the model in Section 2 to incorporate physical capital as a factor of production which we assume is freely mobile across countries. This extension highlights the difference between MP and capital flows: while the former involves technology flows, the latter does not. 30 International technology transfers imbedded in MP activities increase the marginal product of capital in the host economy. Hence, the activity of multinational firms creates a complementarity between capital and FDI flows which reinforces the location patterns of production analyzed in the basic model.
We assume that investment in physical capital is also done in units of the final good. In the initial period, households decide how much to consume and how much to leave as physical capital. The resulting stock of capital is used to set-up foreign affiliates in period zero, before country shocks are realized. And, in period one, after country shocks are realized, capital is used in production.
Production of an intermediate good done by an affiliate of a firm from country j with productivity z, located in i, is given by
while the production of the final good in country i is given by
where 0 < ν < 1.
Since capital is freely mobile across countries (and sectors), the equilibrium allocation entails equalization of marginal products across sectors within a country, across countries, and across usages (i.e. setting up foreign affiliates at time zero, and production of goods in period one).
We add to Definition 1 of the national equilibrium, the allocation of physical capital across sectors, in each country i and state s,
In each country, the marginal product of capital across goods in state s, is equalized,
, for all z and s. Combining this condition with the market clearing condition for good z in (3), we get:
where K i (s) is total capital in country i and state s, (22) , and (23), the capital stock in country i, state s, is:
The characterization of the national equilibrium with physical capital is analogous to the one described in Section 3, with final output in country i given by:
and φ 3 is a positive constant. 31 Solving for world output, we get
, and the average world shock is now A W (s)
As in the framework without physical capital, the weight of a country in aggregate fluctuations is given by the size of its labor force L i , and aggregate productivity of firms located there Z i .
Qualitatively, results are identical to those for the basic model. Thus, Proposition 1 still holds. Everything else equal, foreign affiliates locate in economies with shocks least correlated with world shocks. In that scenario, the existence of MP flows reduces the consumption risk premium in all countries. 32 The inclusion of physical capital reinforces the results in the previous sections. From (24) and (25), the allocation of capital across countries is given by
This expression entails two features of international capital flows that are worth emphasizing. First, while capital flows fluctuate with the (relative) magnitude of country shocks, the weight i is constant across states. This is a direct consequence of the assumption that setting-up an affiliate requires a once-and-for-all cost incurred before uncertainty is realized. In this way, this assumption captures a striking pattern in the data: while financial capital flows are extremely reactive to transitory shocks, MP, as it involves longer term investment, is not. 33 Second, the capital stock for country i in any state, is higher when more productive firms are located there (higher Z i that implies higher i ). This result is particularly relevant for our analysis. Opening foreign affiliates involves technology transfers to the host economy, and that affects the marginal product of all factors there. With mobile capital, MP and capital flows are complements: the more affiliates located in country i, the higher the marginal product of capital there and, therefore, the larger the capital inflows into that economy. This complementarity, by inducing further capital flows into a country, reinforces the shift of production towards economies with shocks least correlated with world risk, and strengths the result in Proposition 1.
Calibration Procedure
We calibrate the variable L i in the model to a measure of equipped labor constructed by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005) , that takes into account physical as well as human capital, an average over the nineties. The United States is normalized to one, L U S = 1. These data are shown in Firm specific productivity in each country follows a Pareto distribution, characterized by the same parameter γ, and scaled by the size of the labor force, G i (z) = L i (1 − z −γ ). Thus, the aggregate productivity of firms operating in their own country is
We calibrate MP entry costs in the model to exactly match the observed gross production of affiliates from country i in country j as share of j's GDP (an average over the nineties), as follows. Define sh ij ≡ E s (X ij /Y j ), where X ij corresponds to aggregate sales of affiliates from country i in country j, and the ratio
we obtain the aggregate productivity index for affiliates from i in j, Z ij ,
Thus, the cut-off productivity level z ij is given by
. Notice that we have I × (I − 1) data point, and need to calibrate I × (I − 1) cut-offs. As in the model, we assume that f ii = 0 so that z ii = z min = 1. The matrix of bilateral MP shares is in table 10.
The stochastic process for the vector A = [A 1 , ..., A I ] is set to match the stochastic properties for the vector of the real GDP per capita (at constant prices, PPP-adjusted) observed in the data over the period 1970-2004, rgdpl t = [rgdpl 1t , ..., rgdpl It ], as follows. 34 In the model, real output (that is equivalent to real GDP) for country i in state s is given by equation (12) , that in logs is
Thus, it is clear that log(Y i (s)) − log(Y i ) = log(A i (s)) − log(A i ), with Y i representing the non-state contingent trend. We assume that log A ∼ N (µ, Ω). For Ω, we take the variancecovariance matrix of the (log of) real GDP per capita across countries in the data, de-trended using a Hodrick-Prescott filter, for the period 1970-2004. The matrix Ω is presented in of) GDP per capita (at current prices, PPP-adjusted) for country i during the nineties, using the following equilibrium relationship from the model: Table 11 : Correlation Matrix for real GDP per capita across countries.
Note: Correlations are calculated after de-trending the log of real GDP per capita at constant prices (RGDPL) from the Penn World Tables (6.2 Note: Bilateral gross value of production for affiliates from country i in country j, as share of country j's GDP, as an average over the nineties, from UNCTAD. Our measure for MP flows is the gross value of production of affiliates from country i in j (see Ramondo, 2008) . Missing values for this variable are estimated using a gravity equation of the form log(Xij/Yj) = Si + Dj + Bd log(dij) + B_f Fij + Bb Lij + eij , where Si and Dj are source and destination country fixed effects, respectively, dij is distance between countries i and j (in kilometers), Fij and Lij are dummy variables equal to one if country-pair share a border and language respectively. Rows: reciepient country j; Columns: origin country i. Diagonal : Xjj/Yj= 1 -sum_i(Xij/Yij). Note: Calibrated Entry Costs. We normalize the entry cost of U.S. firms to the Australian market to one. Rows: reciepient country j; Columns: origin country i. 
